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Objective. To test the hypothesis that declining fertility would affect the number of
cesarean sections (c-sections) on maternal demand, but not medically indicated c-sections.
Data Sources. The 1996–2004 National Health Insurance Research Database in Tai-
wan for all singleton deliveries.
Study Design. Retrospective population-based, longitudinal study. Estimation was
performed using multinomial probit models.
Principal Findings. Results revealed that declining fertility had a significant positive
effect on the probability of having a c-section on maternal request but not medically
indicated c-section.
Conclusions. Our findings offer a precautionary note to countries experiencing a
fertility decline. Policies to contain the rise of c-sections should understand the role of
women’s preferences, especially regarding cesarean deliveries on maternal request.
Key Words. Fertility, cesarean delivery, physician-induced demand, multinomial
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Over the last few decades, cesarean section (c-section) rates have grown
steadily in both developed and developing countries. The growth has raised
concerns about health care costs and reproductive health. Health service
researchers cite financial incentives as a major explanation for the growth of
c-sections (Stafford 1990; Finkler and Wirtschafter 1993; Epstein and New-
house 1998; Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin 1999; Spetz, Smith, and Ennis 2001).
Another possible explanation is physician-induced demand (PID), when ob-
stetricians and gynecologists (ob/gyns) generate demand for more generously
reimbursed c-sections to increase their income because of their advantage in
medical knowledge. Research has used the PID argument as the theoretical
basis to examine the effect of physician financial incentives on c-section use
(Finkler and Wirtschafter 1993; Keeler and Brodie 1993; Gruber, Kim, and




Mayzlin 1999; Grant 2009). However, the results are inconclusive because of
endogeneity problems——that is, unobserved area characteristics correlated
with preferences for medical interventions may cause both higher use and
more physicians in the area, regardless of the extent of PID.
Assuming that ob/gyns have little control over fertility decisions, Dra-
nove and Wehner (1994) suggested that changes in fertility represented an
exogenous shock that would help identify the effects of PID on c-section use.
Using this approach and expanding the theoretical model developed by
McGuire and Pauly (1991), Gruber and Owings (1996) found that a 10 percent
fertility drop in the United States corresponded to a 0.6 percentage increase in
the probability of undergoing a c-section, suggesting that ob/gyns may induce
patients’ demand for higher-reimbursed c-sections over vaginal deliveries.
While their study used identification strategies to mitigate the endogeneity
problem, they failed to take into account a different but related problem.
Although PID may play a part in selecting the mode of delivery, a distinction
should be made between patient’s and physician’s choice regarding the de-
livery mode (Gonen, Tamir, and Degani 2002; Anderson 2004).
Women’s preferences for the delivery mode——specifically the extent to
which cesarean deliveries on maternal request (CDMR) are performed——may
also change when the fertility rate declines (Paranjothy and Thomas 2001). In
countries such as Taiwan where the fertility rate has declined significantly in
recent decades, the increased use of c-sections may reflect a higher social value
of newborns (Cai et al. 1998). C-sections are also believed to be more modern
and more beneficial for a newborn’s health and development in Chinese
society (Wu 2000). Further, women now live longer and have fewer children,
making quality-of-life issues such as the long-term risk of incontinence asso-
ciated with vaginal delivery more prominent and the risks associated with
having subsequent repeated procedures less important (Minkoff and Cherve-
nak 2003). These reasons explain why women may change their personal
choice about the delivery mode. The change may account for the observed
correlation between declining fertility and increased c-section use, particularly
for c-sections without medical complications or CDMR. Yet, to date, there has
been no empirical analysis of the relationship between fertility and CDMR.
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This study examined whether increased c-section use is better explained
by PID or changes in women’s preference of the delivery mode, using longi-
tudinal data from Taiwan. According to Taiwan government reports, the num-
ber of births dropped from 325,545 in 1996 to 216,419 in 2004 (Department of
Household Registration 2009). The general fertility rate (GFR) dropped from 54
live births per 1,000 women aged 15–49 in 1996 to 34 in 2004 (Ministry of
Interior 2009). The dramatic decline in fertility resulted in a significant and
unanticipated negative income shock to ob/gyns whose obstetric practice rev-
enue depends on fertility rates. The fertility decline in Taiwan provides a unique
opportunity to verify the effect of physician financial incentives on c-section use.
During the study period, the national c-section rate increased from 25.40 per-
cent in 1996 to 30.56 percent in 2004. The rate of CDMR was 0.88 percent in
1996 and it peaked at 2.50 percent in 2002 (Appendix SA2).
Our study has three strengths. First, inclusion of virtually all singleton
deliveries in Taiwan and use of a national dataset with comprehensive clinical
information for deliveries alleviates selection bias. Second, universal health
insurance and the single-payer system make Taiwan a favorable research
setting that reduces the confounding effects of health insurance coverage.
Third, our dataset included a code for CDMR that allowed us to accurately
estimate the effect of physician financial incentives by discounting c-sections
that were attributable to patient requests.
METHODS
Our empirical approach was built on prior work (Dranove and Wehner 1994;
Gruber and Owings 1996), but it also included the GFR as an aggregate mea-
sure of women’s preferences for childbirth and the delivery mode as well as the
number of ob/gyns per 100 births as an indication of PID. Women’s preference
for c-sections and PID both predict that a falling fertility rate will lead to
increased c-section use. However, the former is only related to fertility decline
and the preference of pregnant women, whereas the latter operates through the
ratio of ob/gyns to births and the decision belongs largely to ob/gyns.
We hypothesize that a decline in GFR would increase the probability of
having a CDMR, ceteris paribus, because low GFR increases the social value
of newborns and increases women’s preference for c-sections over vaginal
deliveries. On the other hand, an increase in ob/gyns per 100 births would
increase the probability of women having a c-section, ceteris paribus, because
ob/gyns per 100 births measured negative income shock to ob/gyns. In other
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words, the coefficient on GFR captures the effect of fertility decline on women’s
preference of the delivery mode holding constant ob/gyns per 100 births; this
coefficient is expected to be negative. The coefficient on ob/gyns per 100 births,
holding constant GFR, is an estimate of PID and is expected to be positive.
Considering the dynamics of ob/gyns market entry or exit, the variable
ob/gyns per 100 births is not a perfect measure of ob/gyn financial pressure.
Because a physician’s decision to start a practice depends on market condi-
tions, identification of financial pressure solely by ob/gyn density may cause
bias and inconsistency in estimations (Gaynor 1994; McGuire 2000). Thus, we
used the 1-year lagged number of ob/gyns per 100 births. The lagged number
of ob/gyns per 100 births should be highly correlated with the number of ob/
gyns, but it is unlikely to be correlated with unmeasured demand factors. This
should reduce the reverse causality problem.
The other main explanatory variable was GFR, an age-adjusted birth rate,
defined as GFR 5 [number of live births/females aged 15 49]  1000. GFR is
better than gross fertility rates because it accounts for the age composition.
We estimated the multinomial probit model because it provided a gen-
eral framework to study a discrete choice and it allowed correlation between
all alternatives (Bolduc, Lacroix, and Muller 1996). In the model, the depen-
dent variable was a mutually exclusive discrete choice of the delivery mode:
vaginal delivery, c-section, or CDMR. The model had the choice of the de-
livery mode as a function of the logarithm of GFR and the logarithm of the
lagged number of ob/gyns per 100 births. These two explanatory variables
were logged because we were interested in finding the absolute change in the
probability of choosing different delivery modes for a percent change in GFR
and the lagged number of ob/gyns per 100 births. We assumed that the choice
of the delivery mode would also be influenced by clinical indicators and
nonclinical factors (Dubay, Kaestner, and Waidmann 1999). Clinical factors
included previous c-section, fetal distress, dystocia, breech, and other com-
plications (Appendix SA3). Nonclinical individual-level variables included
woman’s age and insurable wage. Nonclinical institutional factors included
ownership, teaching status, accreditation status, and bed size. Ob/gyn factors
included the attending ob/gyn’s age and gender.
The primary data were from the National Health Insurance Research
Database (NHIRD), which contains comprehensive information on the en-
rollment history and medical care use of all National Health Insurance (NHI)
beneficiaries. Fertility and population size were from the 1996 to 2004 Taiwan-
Fuchien Demographic Fact Book (Ministry of Interior 1996–2004) and were
merged with NHIRD by institutional area codes. Delivery modes were
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determined based on the NHI diagnosis-related groups (DRG) code in
the NHIRD (Lin and Xirasagar 2004; Xirasagar and Lin 2004): vaginal de-
livery (DRG 5 0373A), medically indicated c-section (DRG 5 0371A), and
CDMR (DRG 5 0373B, maternal request c-section and no conditions in the
International Classification of Diseases, 9th revision, Clinical Modification
(ICD-9-CM) required).
NHI pays the full cost of a c-section if the delivery mode is medically
indicated. During our study period, the NHI reimbursement rate for medically
indicated c-sections is twice that of a CDMR or a vaginal delivery. If the
c-section is not medically indicated, then the patient must pay out-of-pocket the
cost difference between a c-section and a vaginal delivery. Because of this
regulation, ob/gyns may classify a c-section as medically indicated for the
financial benefit of the patient. However, the coding system is quite accurate
because the government regularly audits claims. Fines for fraud are 100 times
the amount of the false claims charged to the National Health Insurance Bureau
(BNHI) (Xirasagar and Lin 2007; Liu, Chen, and Lin 2008; Liu et al. 2008).
The study population was all singleton deliveries in Taiwan. Multiple
births were excluded because those deliveries may require different obstetric
considerations in terms of the choice of delivery mode (Lin et al. 2004). To be
consistent with previous research, we excluded women above 50 and below
15 years of age, and attending ob/gyn’s age below 25 and above 75. In total,
2,241,980 singleton deliveries were identified and analyzed in the study.
RESULTS
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of the study sample by delivery
modes from 1996 to 2004 (N 5 2,241,980). Overall, there are 693,492 (30.93
percent) cases of c-sections and 40,726 (1.82 percent) cases of CDMR. Women
who had medically indicated c-sections and CDMR were generally older
(29.07 versus 28.15) and earned a higher wage (NT$17,947.48 versus
NT$17,229.22; U.S.$578.95 versus U.S.$555.78). Fourteen percent of the
sample had one or more c-sections; 43.87 percent of c-section cases and 8.23
percent of CDMR cases had a prior c-section history. In general, CDMR was
more likely to be performed in clinics and district hospitals (as opposed to
regional hospitals and medical centers), proprietary institutions (as opposed to
nonprofits), and nonteaching facilities (as opposed to teaching).
We estimated the effect of declining fertility on the use of medically
indicated c-sections and CDMR by calculating the marginal effects of the
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logarithm of GFR and the logarithm of the lagged number of ob/gyns per 100
births in the multinomial probit model (Table 2). We found that a decline in
the logarithm of GFR was associated with an increase in the probability of
CDMR (po.01), but it had no significant association with the probability of
medically indicated c-sections. An increase in the lagged number of ob/gyns
per 100 of births was not associated with any significant change in the prob-
ability of medically indicated c-sections or CDMR, as opposed to vaginal
delivery. The coefficients of a multinomial probit model must be translated
into marginal effects for interpretation. Using the average-of-the probability
method, we found that each 10 percent decrease in GFR was associated with
0.087 percentage points increase in the probability of CDMR as opposed to
vaginal delivery. The effect was sizable because the 37 percent drop in GFR
during our study period can explain about 37 percent of the rise in CDMR rate
(0.88 percent points).
We performed several robustness tests (see Table 3). We first replaced
regional fixed effects with institutional fixed effects and ob/gyn fixed effects to
control for unobserved patient, physician, and organizational conditions (tests
1 and 2). We then excluded women with previous c-section in test 3 because
those women normally receive c-section as a result of their prior history. In test
4, we limited our sample to women aged  34 because prior studies indicated
that women aged 34 and older were more likely to have CDMR (Lin and
Xirasagar 2005). Finally, test 5 included CDMR cases with codes of obstetric
complications (Appendix SA3 except previous c-section) to examine the effect
of coding errors on the results.
The signs and significance levels of coefficients for the main explanatory
variables in Table 3 remain unchanged from those in Table 2. Because in-
stitutional and ob/gyn characteristics change little over time, including the
hospital or ob/gyn fixed effects in robustness tests 1 and 2 reduced the ex-
planatory power of hospital-level variables. Thus, empirical specifications
with only regional and time fixed effects were preferred. In robustness test 3
that included only women with primary c-sections and vaginal delivery, the
effect of the logarithm of GFR on the probability of having CDMR was
greater, corroborating the finding that women preference for c-section in-
creased as a result of the fertility decline. The robustness test 4 is akin to an age-
stratified analysis. It showed a greater effect of the logarithm of GFR on the
probability of having CDMR in women aged 34 and older, indicating those
women were more likely than younger women to have CDMR as a result of
declining fertility. The robustness test 5 showed that errors in obstetric com-
plication coding had little effect on the results.
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To summarize, our findings indicate that maternal requests contributed
significantly to the increased use of c-sections in Taiwan during a period
marked by a rapid fertility decline. The finding was independent from the
effect of PID, indicated by the lagged number of ob/gyns per 100 births, which
was not statistically significant in the analysis.
DISCUSSION
While previous studies revealed that elective c-sections contributed heavily to
the rise in the number of cesarean births (Gregory et al. 2002; Meikle et al.




Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE
Test 1: Ob/gyn fixed effects
Log of general fertility rate  0.223 0.253  0.341nn 0.068
Log of lagged ob/gyns per 100 births 0.426 0.718 0.225 0.279
Test 2: Institutional fixed effects
Log of general fertility rate  0.171 0.232  0.169nn 0.079
Log of lagged ob/gyns per 100 births 0.471 0.801 0.282 0.301
Test 3: Excluding women with prior history of c-section
Log of general fertility rate  0.291 0.285  0.681nn 0.084
Log of lagged ob/gyns per 100 births 0.363 0.518 0.310 0.189
Test 4: Excluding women o34
Log of general fertility rate  0.207 0.231  0.588nn 0.089
Log of lagged ob/gyns per 100 births 0.409 0.319 0.314 0.449
Test 5: Including CDMR with obstetric complications
Log of general fertility rate  0.205 0.121  0.454nn 0.075
Log of lagged ob/gyns per 100 births 0.392 0.641 0.256 0.206
Notes. All multionominal probit regressions included a full set of time dummies.
Coefficients and robust SEs for other explanatory variables are available from the authors.
All estimations were clustered by city/county.
When hospital fixed effects or ob/gyn fixed effects were included in the model (tests 1 and 2),
regional fixed effects were all dropped out because most providers did not move in the short run.
Tests 3–5 included a full set of regional dummies.
N 5 2,235,627 in tests 1 and 2.
N 5 1,921,815 in test 3 (313,812 cases excluded).
N 5 232,673 in test 4 (2,002,954 cases excluded).
N 5 2,241,980 in test 5.
nnpo.01.
CDMR, cesarean deliveries on maternal request; c-section, cesarean section; Ob/gyn, obstetrician
and gynecologist.
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2005), our study further suggests that a significant share of CDMR can be
explained by declining fertility. Moreover, our finding is consistent with the
prior literature that decreasing parity (i.e., most women have less than two
pregnancies) contributes to the decision of delivery modes (Amu, Rajendran,
and Bolaji 1998; Paterson-Brown 1998; Aelvoet et al. 2008). As fertility de-
clines, a larger fraction of births would be first births and a smaller fraction
would be of a higher order (Department of Household Registration 2009).
As the first, and possibly the only, child is highly cherished and valued in
a family, this trend may explain the relationship between declining fer-
tility and increased use of CDMR. However, we are unable, due to data
limitations, to identify that those women with lower fertility were in fact the
same women who were requesting c-sections. A further analysis of women’s
complete fertility history and delivery mode choice would be needed to verify
the explanation.
There are several other explanations for the relationship between de-
clining fertility and increased use of CDMR. First, as women age, compli-
cations in labor are more common, as is the use of artificial reproductive
technologies. As an increasing number of women choose to delay their first
delivery in Taiwan, the relative benefits of CDMR may outweigh the risks.
Second, cultural beliefs and practices influence the perception and desire
about labor and delivery mode. Several studies have reported that the desire
to have a child born on an auspicious date and time may be one major
reason for CDMR in Taiwan (Lo 2003; Hsu et al. 2007; Hsu, Liao, and
Hwang 2008). If the fertility rate continues to decline, it is plausible that
parents would be more inclined to request c-sections at an auspicious time to
bestow their baby a bright future and to bring harmony to both the family
and the baby. Third, many Chinese women prefer c-sections over vaginal
deliveries because they believe that c-sections would improve the health
and intelligence of their newborn (Lee, Holroyd, and Ng 2001). As the
fertility rate drops, women have fewer children and a higher expectation on
the health and well-being of their children. Therefore, CDMR may provide
women an assurance, whether medically justifiable or perceived, for better
infant health outcomes.
Several additional caveats of the study are worth noting. First, the study
lacked data on parity and birth weight, which may affect the choice of delivery
type (Parrish et al. 1994). Second, we were unable to explicitly account for
physician and institutional factors, such as physician’s demand for leisure, tax
benefits, and hospital/clinic staffing constraints (Burns, Geller, and Wholey
1995; Brown 1996; Dickert-Conlin and Chandra 1999), which may confound
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the findings, although robustness check with fixed effects showed that these
are unlikely to matter. Third, information inaccuracies are likely in an ad-
ministrative dataset. Ob/gyns, clinics, and hospitals may up-code clinical
complications to help patients seek full reimbursement for c-sections. To the
extent up-coding exists, the number of CDMR would be under-reported and
our estimation of the effect of fertility decline on CDMR would be conser-
vative. To prevent up-coding, the BNHI has exercised close oversight and
imposed a severe financial penalty on transgressions. We suspected that the
oversight of the BNHI may partly explain the redundant reporting of medical
complications for a small number of CDMR cases (e.g., CDMR with obstetric
complications). Whether those cases were included in the analysis did not
affect the findings of the study.
We propose that more future research (e.g., longitudinal studies and
well-designed clinical as well as questionnaire surveys) will be needed to un-
derstand the use of CDMR versus vaginal delivery and to inform policies.
Against the background of rapidly declining fertility, women may play a more
important role in determining the mode of delivery than ever before. Financial
incentives designed specifically for physicians may not have the desired effect
(Lo 2008). Our study also illustrates that health policies aimed at altering
physician and patient behaviors should consider the social context. Recent
statistics showed that CDMR rates have maintained an upward trend (Ap-
pendix SA2). Moreover, two studies (Lin, Hu, and Lin 2008; Liu, Chen, and
Lin 2008) based on NHIRD showed that c-sections (including CDMR) lead to
higher postpartum health care use and poorer health outcomes. Such research
would be useful in initiating evidence-based policies to reduce CDMR rates
and for educating physicians and patients that CDMR could be costly and
harmful for mothers and their babies. Our findings offer a precautionary note
to countries experiencing a fertility decline. Policies to contain the rise of
c-sections should understand the role of women’s preferences, especially
regarding CDMR.
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